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The Cadence of Becoming 
 
To resume again... 
In the current debates of Continental philosophy there is a return to questioning the 
sufficiency of Becoming as a conceptual framing of change and transformation. Perhaps 
it was the good timing of people like Alain Badiou, Peter Hallward, Adrian Johnston, 
and Slavoj Žižek in their return to that grand theosophical figure of German Idealism 
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling that has promoted this debate. There again, 
perhaps it was the rhetoric of Becoming after Henri Bergson and Bergson's reinvention 
by the Deleuze-machine gaining a new purchase on life. But the debates are most 
certainly localised around Quentin Meillassoux's small treatise After Finitude. 
 Away from the delights of philosophy, in the unthought traces of mundane 
everyday life, contingency gets a bad name. Call it 'risk' and it is something you insure 
yourself against. Call it 'love' and it is something that destroys your beloved through 
your idealisation of them. Or call it 'choice' and you'll find the dissatisfaction 
promulgated by the crises of capitalisms both in the traditional liberal-democratic forms 
and in the new authoritarian modes. When we purvey our epoch what are we to think? 
We appear to invest so much time and energy towards insulating ourselves from 
contingency that talking about it might be yet another analgesic tactic to assuaging it... 
 When our fabulous conference conveners Anna and Charlotte approached me to 
be a speaker at this event I had initially reacted with some good humoured skepticism at 
their offer. It's not that I didn't want to accept their offer, but that I had been contingently 
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situated in an invited position for which I had not applied. Of course, all my anxiety 
about their invitation was quickly overcome by my post-secular, atheistic and idiotic 
jouissance. Yet what is most interesting to me is that what I experienced in this moment 
is what 'contingency' is for contemporary Continental philosophy: something that erupts 
into the life of the human subject as a speaking-being for which there are no words but 
that demands witness and testimony. To bear witness and speak a testimonial then, the 
speaking-subject is forced to either transform their position such that they can find their 
voice again, to transgressively act-out the neurotic sham of 'voicing the unvoiceable', or 
to fail at both and suffer aphasia. The kernel of this moment of contingency is where I 
will begin. 
 
Transformation, Transgression, Failure 
What I wish to bring forward here is a brief sketch of how this underlying principle of 
contingency enables the possibilities of transgressions and transformations. Already in 
Freud we encounter such a formal principle of contingency in the primal binary-
signifier between what is and what is not, the Vorstellungs-Repräsentanz. This concept 
of the binary-signifier is always about loss, precisely the loss that is incurred with the 
entry to language for which language promises surplus reward but often delivers too 
little, never quite giving back the 'lost object'. The Vorstellungs-Repräsentanz is thus the 
ontological principle that structures the Becoming of a speaking-being: it is the longing 
for that which is lost even to the Unconscious. 
 From here we can map transgression and transformation as two ways of 
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encountering the space that is opened up to Becoming. In transgression the subject 
functions as a stand-in for the empty place of the lost object. Here what is properly 
transgressive oversteps the limit of the world as it is given but does not break with the 
prevailing order. Rather, transgression relies on the limits instantiated by the prevailing 
logic, or Otherness, of the world. 
 Transformation, on the other hand, is an attempt to reorient the speaking-being's 
relationship to the lost object. Negative or affirmative, transformations always move 
within the letter of what the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan calls the Symbolic Law. 
When transformations succeed we find ourselves realigned in the field of the Other. 
When transformations misfire we are confronted by 'symptoms', a kind of ciphered 
message that isn't addressed to anyone in particular and which belies an ambiguity about 
the status of the speaking-being: the one who is not duped by the arbitrary rules of 
language is the one who errs. 
 At a glance then it is transformation that is the more radical turn of the two. But 
what a failed transformation reveals is ontologically primary to what a successful 
transformative affirmation offers. What then does this mean for us in the developed 
West today in our era of technologically-saturated crises? I would argue that such a 
question is stepping into the ring with the Other all too quickly. Instead, I suggest we 
take some time and find some space to consider what is being unveiled by all this 
symptomatic symbolic junk, this structure of the symptom. 
 
The Structure of the Symptom 
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The structure of the symptom in psychoanalysis exhibits many of the features that one 
can attribute to transgression or transformation.  
 Symptoms are anachronistic, without time; there is never a 'right time' for a 
symptom to emerge. While symptoms may vary in what they are, the basic structure of a 
symptom points in two directions: the vague and enigmatic past from which it has 
emerged and the uncertain future into which it endlessly repeats. This is what makes the 
symptom anachronistic, its double-time without a fixed, frozen present time. Symptoms 
in this sense are transgressive: they perforate the arbitrary limits instantiated by the 
Other and its Law by staging an out-of-joint remainder in the place where representation 
'ought' to be excluded. To this extent the before-time of the symptom is what Freud 
called the Vorstellungs-Repräsentanz: those signifiers that stand in for the void of 
excluded representations. 
 The symptom is also enigmatic. Where a letter always arrives at its destination, 
the symptom has no destination, no addressee in particular. But what the symptom does 
address in its generality, namely the Unconscious, is not something added to the 
speaking-being. Rather, as anyone who reads Freud or Lacan closely will note, the 
Unconscious emerges in the cut that gives voice to being. This cut is what Lacan calls 
'symbolic castration', the threat that reality might decay. Or, to put it another way, the 
speaking-being as a subject always begins from the choice between 'nothing' and 
'something' where this 'something' is “always irreducibly in the sense of ‘something 
extra, something additional, something foreign / put on, in a certain respect something 
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contingent.’”1 The symptom is thus enigmatic because it is 'put on', which is not to say 
that it's all that easy to get off precisely because the symptom is acephalous rather than 
given by the Other. 
 The resistance of the symptom to the interpretation of the Other is its jouissance. 
But what Lacan calls jouissance, the suffering of enjoyment or enjoyable suffering, is 
intimately connected with the modality of the symptom. There is a lesson here for ideas 
of transformation because the modulation of jouissance oscillates through the chances 
to make and modify sense. If jouissance is the ineffable suffering of the symptom, the 
enjoying of its infinite repetition, then we can also postulate three modes of enjoying the 
symptom: jouis-sans or without sense; jouis-sens or with a sense of direction; and 
j'ouïs-sens or I am moving on. This variability of jouissance is the mark of its 
contingency. Jouissance doesn't add anything to polite plaisir, instead it intervenes in 
enjoyment but mostly remains void or at least avoided. 
 
Chaos and Contingency 
This structure of the symptom highlights the contingency at play in ontology. The 
intervention of jouissance into enjoyment, of the symptom into the chain of 
signification enunciated by the speaking-being, is brought about by the failure of the 
Other. Were the Other whole, a consistent totality, there would be no symbolic 
misfiring, no symptoms. With the manifestation of the symptom however a path is 
opened towards understanding the primacy of a negativity that enables change in 
principle. Somewhere between ontological thinking and psychoanalysis there is a path 
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that winds down the chasm of contingency. This contingency is the jouissance that 
intervenes in the 'normal' regularity of Becoming and sets it awry, teasing out 
transformations and transgressions. 
 Contingency's renewed importance in contemporary Continental philosophy has 
been championed by thinkers already au fait with psychoanalysis, namely the 
aforementioned Badiou, Meillassoux, Johnston and Žižek. While for reasons of time we 
will have to leave aside many of these figures, I would like to focus on Žižek's reading 
of Meillassoux as it relates to the possibility for transformation and transgression prior 
to the emergence of a being who might be subject to, for, or by transformation and 
transgression. 
 Žižek’s encounters with the Chaos belying Meillassoux’s vision of contingency 
persist in the interstices between the Jenaer Realphilosophie of Hegel and the Die 
Weltalter of Schelling. The vestiges of these two oeuvres are especially prominent in an 
essay by Žižek called The Abyss of Freedom that accompanies a translation of the 
second-draft of Schelling’s Die Weltalter.2 Here, in the opening discussion of the 
interaction of Ground and Existence, Žižek comes upon the concept that locates chaos 
in both Hegel and Schelling: madness. No mere psychologism, Žižek’s analysis 
attempts to pinpoint the way that the normal run of our immediate natural surrounds 
(Umwelt) is always-already thrown off balance by the incommensurability (in principle) 
of Ground’s maddening impenetrability and the transparent ‘rational’ determinism of 
Existence. What is at stake here is not the given-ness of things but the hampering of 
Ground’s preontological status, “it only ‘is’ sous rature, in the mode of its own 
                                                 
2  See AF/AW. 
 7 
withdrawal.”3 Thus any being in particular (up to and including God), for Žižek’s 
reading of Schelling, is rendered contingent on the basis that its full self-identity is 
thwarted by the withdrawal of Ground from the ontology of Being (Existence) because 
it lacks “any proper ontological consistency.”4 Here madness enters as the “violent 
gesture of contraction that negates every being outside itself.”5  
 Žižek pursues this moment of madness through the Jenaer Realphilosophie of 
Hegel to a point that is noticeably similar to Meillassoux’s encounters with the chaotic 
necessity of contingency. As Žižek states, “the subject is no longer the Light of Reason 
opposed to the nontransparent, impenetrable Stuff (of Nature, Tradition…); his very 
kernel, the gestures that opens up the space for the Light of Logos, is absolute negativity 
qua ‘night of the world.’”6 What concerns Žižek here is not the fall into madness as a 
regression into the chaotic abyss of Ground’s inconsistency (as Abgrund) but how the 
subject emerges from the abyss of madness into ‘normalcy’. 
This locus of Chaos in Žižek operates in a manner that matches Meillassoux’s 
speculative mode. In Meillassoux the question of how to make sense of ancestral 
statements beyond the finite horizon of the subject’s normalcy (Kantian finitude) locates 
its mad ‘principle of unreason’ in the realism of Ground’s preontological status: 
Schellingian Ground as characterised by Žižek is, for Meillassoux, the Chaos that belies 
contingency. The Hegelian confrontation with madness achieves this in terms of the 
subject while Schelling conceives of such radical contingency in terms of the unity of 
                                                 
3  Žižek in AF/AW, p. 6 
4  Žižek in AF/AW, p. 6 
5  Žižek in AF/AW, p. 8 
6  Žižek in AF/AW, p. 9 
 8 
Ground (Chaos) and Existence (Being) in the world. 
 At this point it is crucial to emphasise that although Ground and Existence are 
not identical this does not make them co-dependent or correlated. Rather, they operate 
in a manner that allows one and the same cause to produce opposite effects. The ‘mad 
act’ of contingently withdrawing from the madness of Chaos is to shift out of the 
excessivity of Chaos and not to instate a type of cosmic balance between Ground and 
Existence. Compositely, the contingency that grounds the instantiation of every logos 
reveals the insufficiency of Being to but not be a totality (i.e. a being is not given but 
rather is not no-thing). Parting ways with Schelling’s effort to unify Ground and 
Existence, Žižek similarly underscores how “the codependence of two antagonistic 
forces does not reside in the fact that one force needs the other as the only ground 
against which it can assert itself.”7  
This folding back of Existence and Ground upon themselves rather than purely 
in antagonistic codependence is a familiar trope of the novels of Chuck Palahniuk. 
Palahniuk, like other American literary minimalists such as Amy Hempel, structures his 
prose to play with the subterranean meanings a reader's judgement imposes on a text in 
the very act of reading. As a reader you never see the bullet coming, and this is perhaps 
sage advice for an attempt to exert tyrannical control of transformation and 
transgression given the autonomic character of Ground and the Existence that brings 
forth the subject. 
The procedures of Palahniuk’s plots, narratives, and characters are always 
revealing the chaotic vortex beneath the austere assurances of civil society; i.e. what I 
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earlier referred to as risk, love, and choice. But this elaboration of chaotic contingency 
in Palahniuk's work is foremost Romantic, not nihilistic. This is important because it 
helps us to locate a way out of the tired nihilism that characterised thought in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Palahniuk's novel Diary is particularly instructive in 
how to eschew nihilism through references to the poetic mania of Ground as 
encountered by the novel's absent antagonist, Peter Wilmot. 
In Diary, we are told that the character of Peter Wilmot, the comatose husband 
of Misty Wilmot (the narrator), spent time prior to the opening of the narrative 
refurbishing houses, and in these houses he hid rooms covered with fanatical raving. 
These rooms, these dark places, bob up to the surface of Diary with a sense of 
untimeliness. Peter has entered the resident’s homes in good faith and vandalised the 
space, motivated by his being overwhelmed by the terror that Waytansea Island’s 
families intend to perpetrate.  
Peter’s rooms are what Palahniuk elsewhere refers to as a ‘chorus’, a recurring 
theme that brings forward the kernel of the narrative. But what is being repeated here? 
The rooms of Peter Wilmot are dark places where the entire space has been overtaken 
by someone’s graphic mania. To quote: 
 “These summer people, poor Misty, she tells them, Mr. Wilmot wasn’t himself 
for the last year or so. He had a brain tumor he didn’t know about for—we don’t 
know how long. Her face still pressed to the hole in the wallpaper, she tells this 
Angel Delaporte how Mr. Wilmot did some work in the old Waytansea Hotel, 
and now the room numbers jump from 312 to 314. Where there used to be a 
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room, there’s just perfect, seamless hallway, chair molding, baseboard, new 
power outlets every six feet, top-quality work. All of it code, except the room 
sealed inside. 
 And this Ocean Park man swirls the wine in his glass and says, ‘I hope 
room 313 wasn’t occupied at the time.’ 
 Out in her car, there’s a crowbar. They can have this door-way opened 
back up in five minutes. It’s just drywall is all, she tells the man. Just Mr. 
Wilmot going crazy. 
 When she puts her nose in the hole and sniffs, the wallpaper smells like a 
million cigarettes came here to die. Inside the hole, you can smell cinnamon and 
dust and paint. Somewhere inside the dark, you can hear a refrigerator hum. A 
clock ticks. 
 Written around and around the walls, it’s always this same rant. In all 
these vacation houses. Written in a big spiral that starts at the ceiling and spins 
to the floor, around and around so you have to stand in the center of the room 
and turn to read it until you’re dizzy. Until it makes you sick.”8 
These houses that contain Peter’s rooms perform the function of Existence: they 
are domestic spaces that solidify an attachment to a place, a time, a history, a symptom. 
But it is as though the possibility of Peter’s rooms was always there, hiding in plain 
sight: all the island’s families knew about the planned terror, all the mainland visitors to 
Waytansea Island were implicated. The history of the homes carried this within the very 
act of dwelling inside them. Peter Wilmot’s lost rooms, his dark places, are the 
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realisation of a contingent possibility always-already present in the structure of 
Waytansea Island’s civility: the abyss of Ground breaking through the illusion of the 
logos or totality of the community's Existence. 
 
Contingency of the Symptom 
Although we might contend from the above discussion that the contingent withdrawal 
from Chaos/Nothing is necessary for the manifestation of any logos as such, the 
properly philosophical encounter with this withdrawal appears to arise at the very 
moment of a contingent gap emerging in the extant state of logos, of a voice in Being. 
This presents, quite literally, a terrain of transformative possibilities by exposing logos 
to its arbitrary foundation; and the dark rooms of Peter Wilmot are precisely such an 
exposé of the façade of Existence as the Being of community. Yet the logos of Being 
elucidated by Meillassoux seems to indicate that this logos encodes Chaos as an 
impenetrable symptom: the mad withdrawal from Chaos that has no logos to its 
movement. And what is the name for such a formation of contingency in logos as a 
cipher (on the side of logos, an element irreducible to logos) but ‘the symptom’―a term 
noticeably absent from Meillassoux’s discourse in After Finitude. 
 Certainly, we might consider this symptomal character of contingency is what 
makes the normalcy of logos go awry in the sense that every attempt at formal-notional 
determination rests on a ‘mad act’ of an arbitrary violent gesture: not being nothing. Yet 
a propos of Meillassoux (and Schelling), the contingency of this persistence in logos 
also suggests that contingency is a troubling, maddening element that puts the human 
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subject awry. The subject supposed by Meillassoux’s speculative non-metaphysical 
philosophy herein must come to terms with the symptom of their own mad 
arising/grounding in Existence―not in the limited subjectivist view of some New Age 
construction of natural wisdom, but instead in the infinitely demanding atemporal depth 
of Chaos in which even our natural surroundings are necessarily contingent and prone to 
giving way. 
 Such an analysis of the contingency of the symptom (of existence) invites an 
opportunity to think through the subject of Meillassoux’s philosophical, non-
metaphysical speculation as non-All. The rejection of totality in Meillassoux's analysis 
breaks apart totality from logos, the space between which is chaotic: an unfolding of 
partial objects in an endless night. The speculative subject of the contingent withdrawal 
from Chaos is thus confronted with their void-status. Herein the subject is rendered as 
‘void’ by the ontological Void of Chaos, the site of speculative analysis becomes the 
enigmatic ground of Being. The symptom highlighted by contingency in this way is 
therefore the very existence of the subject as such; the subject as a formal construct of 
minimal difference between the logos of Existence and some enigmatic, impenetrable, 
imperfect, contingent Ground. It is only on virtue of this incompleteness of Existence-
Ground that the mad act of withdrawal from Chaos can be recognised retroactively as 
the ‘necessity of contingency’. Herein the subject is non-All, never quite elucidated by 
the totalisation of logos, instead always a partial void. 
 Such a view of Chaos and Being can be seen in the  cyberpunk fictionalisations 
of virtual reality. In these literary speculations, authors such as William Gibson draw out 
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the affective materiality of the contingency of being-in-the-abyss but also go further 
than Meillassoux by examining the extension in a chaotic Void. In his early works 
Gibson provides us with an interesting example of how the ‘mad act’ of withdrawal 
allows the subject to be non-All and yet prone to the contingent effects of logos. In the 
acclaimed Neuromancer (1982), Count Zero (1984), and Mona Lisa Overdrive (1988), 
Gibson develops a topological vision of cyberspace as an empty plane populated with 
geometrical objects that represent hordes of data. One enters cyberspace through 
electrodes placed about the head that are attached to a ‘deck,’ or interface, allowing 
access to and navigation around the matrix of cyberspace. The spatiality of Gibson’s 
cyberspace is itself empty, a kind of Void-Nothing whose depth is characterised by the 
relative quality of the representations of geometrical data (logos) to one another and the 
user’s intellect (analogical to Meillassoux’s ‘speculative realism’) that may, at any 
moment, shift, turn, collapse, and so forth. Embodiment remains a 'necessary evil' of 
this technological interaction in Gibson’s narrative vision. For example, the subject can 
still experience vertigo but feels an uncanny absence of resistance when hastening 
through this Void. Gibson’s cyberspace cowboys ‘feel’ the Void-Nothing of cyberspace, 
the Void impresses sensations seemingly from within the ‘sense’ of logos. ‘Sense’ is 
thus rendered categorical and formless in-itself, a type of non-metaphysical chora in the 
way it opens the possibility for these sensations felt in the Void to be incommensurable 
with the disembodied rationale of navigating cyberspace. 
 What is curious about Gibson’s narration of the Void is how, upon entering 
cyberspace, a character will lose their sense of actual embodiment because the domain 
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of virtual reality is far more replete with immediacy however chaotic. This is in accord 
with how all logos is, in the view of Meillassoux and Žižek-vis-Schelling, put on, fake, 
virtual, etc. The senses that absorb the ‘natural surroundings’ of the Umwelt intrude on 
the virtual field of possibility, the feel of using the deck to navigate cyberspace, for 
example, tends to only report sensations pertinent for the intentions in cyberspace, the 
phenomenology of this Void. With immediacy on the side of the virtual the actual is 
overcome by the reality of the virtual/logos. That is to say, where there is no active 
subjectivity the Void remains in its virtuality to hide the necessary contingency of the 
body.  
Something within Sense but greater than a sense itself informs the cowboys’ 
intelligence to navigate the space: fantasy. This is so because the Void is replete with an 
irrational immediacy coextensive with the ‘effervescent punctuality’ of consciousness. 
The Void/Chaos appears in the most fleeting of instances as it withdraws and 
speculative fantasy sublates the ‘gap’ in its wake. However, as Meillassoux and Žižek 
show, the subject cannot transcend this paradoxical ‘empty’ permanence of the 
Void/Chaos but only the withdrawal, the contingency of Sense. 
 As in Žižek’s engagement with the philosophy of Deleuze it is the ‘reality of the 
virtual’ that is at stake in the Void, its “transcendental empiricism.” This empiricism is 
transcendental in the sense of the “a priori conditions of possibility of our experience of 
constituted reality,” or, as Gibson accents with the presence of an electroencephalogram 
(EEG) on each deck to measure brain activity: you can really die in cyberspace; logos 
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can really annihilate you.9 Such a view understands the Void/Chaos as the formlessness 
from which the subject-as-a-being emerges, and is distinct insofar as it lacks the oceanic 
feeling of being amongst a multitude of like beings. But given Žižek’s comments on 
Meillassoux’s analysis, what Gibson’s narrative portrayal shows on the contrary is that 
Chaos is not that which receives the existing thing in its death, the collapse of our mad 
withdrawal from it, but that which endows the logos of Being with an unreflective and 
even narcissistic ‘there-ness.’ Herein the withdrawal from Chaos provides temporality 
only to make it recurrent and without end, although in itself it is a priori to the 
mediation of the grounding of any logos. 
The persistence of a subject in Gibson’s Void/Chaos rests upon the mad act of 
the withdrawal from this Void. But what is ultimately contingent, what is most 
precarious, is the counting of this void-subject in Existence as a gap inherent to the 
foundation of logos, the very point where any logos can be arbitrarily grounded. 
Gibson’s phenomenology of the Void-Nothing reveals that the death of the subject is 
only possible through the disappearance of its registration in logos, but that such a death 
is always part of logos where the chaotic Ground unhinges the arbitration of the formal-
notional determination of Being. 
 
Conclusion 
Whether we discuss philosophy, psychoanalysis, or other literatures, today there is an 
urgent need to confront and traverse the contingency that belies the persistence of the 
speaking-subject. An all too ordinary analysis would suggest that symptoms manifest in 
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response to a Cause that annihilates all other valuations. But what has been shown here 
today is that we cannot conclude in nihilism because, structurally speaking, it is 
contingency that is revealed by nihilistic clearing, and this contingency juxtaposes the 
persistence of the subject to the abyss of Ground: this persistence is untimely, it is past 
and future, it is a symptom laden with jouissance. Contingency, in this way, enables 
metamorphoses through transformations or transgressions by delimiting the conditions 
of possibility. In Palahniuk's romantic minimalism this is the fragility of the logos of 
community, and in Gibson's cyberpunk you can really die in cyberspace. Both of these 
examples offer a way to understand the possibility for transformation and transgression 
through recognising the formal incompleteness of the existence of the speaking-subject 
in their change, transformation, and transgression—their contingent Becoming. 
